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THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TOWARDS THE 
UNITED STATES: HOW RELEVANT IS THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 
CONSTRAINING OR REPLACING US HEGEMONY? 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
Europe and the United States have yielded hegemony in international relations for 
several centuries. In the XIX century, Europe was the hegemonic power. In the midst of 
the XX, the leadership of World Power was conquered by the United States, and 
nowadays the United States has an unquestionable hegemony in international relations. 
Defeated by its own ambitions of dominance, Europe learned the lessons of World War 
II, began a period of reconstruction, and created a new political and economic process to 
eradicate the possibility of a new war within its borders: European integration.  
 
  In the wake of the XXI century, the United States maintains its prominent role in 
international affairs. On the east side of the Atlantic Ocean, individual European 
countries cannot seriously challenge U.S. power, neither in military nor in economic 
affairs. In some cases, only two or three countries are able to raise their voices in 
disagreement to the United States and sometimes they are heard by the American 
hegemon. However, the equation of power in the transatlantic area changes relatively 
when the fifteen EU members are able to join their national interests under a common 
front. 
 
  The study object of this paper is the external relations of the European Union 
towards the United States. The core question of this essay is not the U.S. hegemony by 
itself; in fact, both parties agree on a myriad of issues, share common values, and keep 
intensive and active economic and political exchanges. The 1950s and 1960s were 
witness to the shining power of the United States and Europe was willing to receive 
U.S. aid through the Marshall Plan. The problem arises when U.S. policies affect 
Europe and the EU is not able to provide concrete actions to reverse them. At this point, 
one inquiry is the focus of the analysis:  How relevant is the EU in constraining or 
replacing U.S. hegemony? A simple answer is insufficient to shed light on this question. 
Most scholars underline the shortcomings of the EU and the influence of the United 
States in determining EU external relations. However, the EU in 2002 is quite different 
from the European Community at the beginning of the 1990s. Although reactive to 
international and regional, political and economic stimuli, the EU has forged informal 
and formal practices to provide coordinated positions. Depending on the specific area, 
the EU’s performance is more or less successful. Whereas in economic issues the EU 
has been able to respond to the U.S. in trade disputes, in political and security affairs the 
panorama is mostly discouraging. 
 
  Accordingly, the hypothesis of this paper is: The more the EU is able to encapsulate 
the interests of the fifteen member states in a common front, the greater are the 
opportunities for more beneficial agreements with the United States, and to constrain or 
replace the actions or inactions of U.S. hegemony. In order to support this proposition, 
four areas of the transatlantic relationship are examined in this paper. The first part 
focuses on the current theoretical debate on the transatlantic relationship.  Secondly, the 
paper analyzes the different natures of both foreign policies, emphasizing the problems 
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associated with the European (intergovernmental and supranational) model to design its 
external relations. The third section describes the relative balance between the US and 
the EU on economic terms, and considers the benefits of having international 
institutions to regulate trade practices. Finally, the imbalance in security affairs is 
depicted, highlighting the new institutional developments in Europe to participate in 
regional crises with or without (but not against) the United States.  
  
 
Some Theoretical Notes about the Transatlantic Relationship 
 
As the analysis of international relations is multidimensional, there are countless 
interpretations of it. Depending on the author, three broad theoretical perspectives about 
international reality can be generally identified: conservative (realist), liberal, and 
revolutionary (transformational) world-views.
1 Perceptions and understandings of world 
affairs are deeply influenced by the position of states in the international arena. Third 
world countries are prone to denounce inequalities, whereas developed ones highlight 
the virtues of democracy and free markets. Although after the end of the Cold War the 
political discourse has narrowed its polarization, the need to bridge the gap between 
poor and rich countries persists.  
 
Despite the cultural differences among the 16 countries involved in the EU-U.S. 
relationship, both societies share the "Euro-American way of life",
2 namely, closely 
intertwined values as well as political and economical principles based on common 
premises (free markets and political democracy). Development, political stability, and 
welfare are some of the distinctive characteristics of the societies on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Derived from those characteristics, the internal dialogue between the U.S. and 
the EU is basically North-North oriented, whereas the external contacts with other parts 
of the world have a different agenda, being West-East or North-South oriented.  
 
Consequently, the transatlantic relationship relies on liberal-realist worldviews, 
which can be explained as follows: “Realism emphasizes the enduring propensity for 
conflict between the states; liberalism identifies several ways to mitigate these 
conflictive tendencies”.
3  
 
In addition to this first delimitation that helps to put in context the transatlantic 
relationship, both sides of the Atlantic have different ways of practicing the liberal and 
realist principles.  Intentionally, Robert Kagan
4 has “caricaturized” the US and Europe. 
“Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil…. favor policies of 
coercion rather than persuasion… (While) Europeans insist they approach problems 
with greater nuance and sophistication… They generally favor peaceful responses to 
problems preferring negotiating, diplomacy, and persuasion than coercion”.
5  
                                                           
1 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations (Brief Edition) (United States: Longman, 2002); James E. 
Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive 
Survey (New York: Longman, 2001). 
2 The common ground that Transatlantic societies share is the source of the "Eurocentric difussionism", 
concept presented particularly by James Morris Blaut in two books: The Colonizer's Model of the World 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), and Eight Eurocentric Historians  (New York: The Guilford 
Press, 2000). 
3 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” International Relations (Spring 
1998).   
4 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review 113 (June/July 2002). 
5 Ibid. 
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From the perspective of the present essay, the problem must be focused on the 
liberal and realist positions that both parties assume in particular contexts. Kagan’s 
picture depicts general trends of both behaviors, and to some extent oversimplifies the 
relationship, as Kagan himself acknowledges. What is beneath his argument is that the 
European as well as the American histories have modeled two different societies, which 
offer two competing or cooperating positions on particular themes. However, when the 
discussion about the excesses, limitations or failures to act by the U.S. comes to the 
floor, the response from Europe differs depending on the issue in question.  The actions 
and non-actions of the hegemon are not effectively challenged merely with speeches in 
opposition to its foreign policy. Power makes possible the achievement of foreign 
policy objectives to counteract or fill the vacuum left by the hegemon. 
 
Power is a key concept in international relations. The European hegemony was 
built under different premises of power than the American one. Violent territorial 
conquests were replaced by the sophistication of technology, multinationals, and “global 
culture”. At the same time, particularly during the XX century, the international society 
developed different types of cooperation through the emergence of norms, regimes, and 
institutions. Despite the fact that the most important international institutions such as the 
United Nations or the World Trade Organization are highly determined by U.S. policies, 
those and other organizations have gained autonomous capacity in constraining, 
although not always successfully, the U.S. or the European unilateralisms. In other 
words, the international context and the nature of the European hegemony were quite 
different from the current one of the United States.  
 
  Considering the ambience in which the United States has yielded power, since 
the inception of the European integration, Europe has increased its capabilities to 
leverage U.S. decisions. Currently, not only are “high politics” (military capabilities) 
important, but also “soft politics” (economic capabilities). According to this broader 
understanding of power, Roy Ginsberg analyzed the political impact of the EU on the 
United States from 1990 to 1999. His results point out that “the EU had nil impact in 
seven areas (10 percent of total), marginal impact in ten instances (14 percent), 
considerable political impact in twenty-five instances (35 percent), and significant 
political impact in thirty instances (42 percent)”.
6 
 
   From the above mentioned, one preliminary and general speculation, which will 
be tested in the next pages, comes into sight. Parallel to the common values shared by 
the EU and the United States, there are different perceptions in approaching the bilateral 
agenda, and the creation of power capabilities is a key element to enable the EU to 
influence the United States.  
 
A step forward in the present analysis is to explore some of the ideas of 
theoreticians about the transatlantic relationship. In explaining the dynamic of the 
transatlantic relationship, the perspective of security communities offers a helpful 
framework in understanding this relationship in the long-term. In using this perspective, 
Karl Deutsch characterized the EU-U.S. relationship as a Pluralist Security Community
7 
in the mid-1950s. Within this community, war was not considered an instrument of 
                                                           
6 Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics. Baptism by Fire (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p. 181. 
7 Karl Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1957). 
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rational politics. Theoretically, a security community can be of two types -amalgamated 
and pluralistic- "while both have dependable expectations of peaceful change, the 
former exists when states formally unify, the latter when states retain their 
sovereignty".
8 
 
  Even though the analytical scheme of security communities has been frequently 
used as a framework to study the transatlantic relationship, it is important to point out 
that this concept was put in question at the end of the Cold War. Before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, according to Ole Wæver, “What is called in the literature a ‘security 
community’ is really a non-war community, and therefore if we accept a concept of 
security wider than a non-war there can be (non-military) security problems and security 
dynamics in a security community”.
9 In other words, one should consider the concept of 
security community in a broad sense and realize that security community includes not 
only studies on NATO, but also on trade and the consolidation of the integration 
process.   
 
    Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have attempted to update Deutsch’s 
framework. These authors state that between neo-realism and constructivism there is a 
continuum. On the one end, neo-realism conceives the structure of international politics 
defined to a great extent by the distribution of power. The neo-liberal institutionalism 
and the English School, in the middle of this continuum, focus on how states construct 
institutions to encourage cooperation, even though they share with neo-realism the 
assumption of anarchy. Under this perspective, Hedley Bull states that international 
society has developed the transatlantic state system, "in which cooperation and 
sociability between states has largely superseded traditional realpolitik instincts".
10 At 
the other end of that continuum, constructivism recognizes that "international reality is a 
social construction driven by collective understandings, including norms, that emerge 
from social interactions".
11 
 
   The uncertainty stemming from the disappearance of external threats questioned 
the future role of the EU-U.S. and provoked different explanatory approaches. From a 
pessimistic standpoint, John J. Mearsheimer stated that Germany and Russia would 
return to the classic alliance patterns of the nineteenth-century.
12 Stephen M. Walt 
points out that there are deep structural forces that are beginning to drift Europe and 
America apart. Walt argues that three traditional unifying forces have begun to 
disappear: A) where there is no threat, there is no cohesion –security--, B) both parties 
are drifting apart in terms of international trade, C) there are growing differences among 
the elite of both parties as a result of generational and demographic changes in the 
United States.
13 
 
                                                           
8 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 5. 
9 Ole Wæver, “Insecurity, Security, and Security in the West European non-war Community,” in Security 
Communities Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, p. 71. 
10  Adrian Hyde-Price, "The New Patterns of International Relations in Europe" in Rethinking the 
European Union. Institutions, Interests and Identities eds. Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman (New 
York: St. Martin Press, 1996), pp. 23-24. 
11 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, p. 10. 
12 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security  15, 1 (Summer 1990). 
13 Stephen M. Walt, “The Ties that Fray. Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart,” The National 
Interest (Winter 1998/1999).  
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Under the realist approaches, the Grand Strategy of the United States opens a relevant question 
with regard to Europe: what must be the role of the United States in  European affairs, 
particularly in military terms? According to John Mearsheimer, the United States should 
maximize relative power to gain security in order to avoid the instability resulting from 
multipolar systems. The U.S. behavior has been consistent with the Grand Strategy of 
keeping its primacy during and after the Cold War. Opposed to this argument, 
Christopher Layne recommends that the United States should follow the “offshore 
balancing” strategy, disengaging U.S. military commitments in Europe and Asia, 
rejecting its commitment to economic interdependence, and abstaining from ambitions 
to perpetuate hegemony. Aside from the obvious differences of both realist approaches, 
it seems that they coincide in the evidence that “the US insists that European 
integration, and ESDP, can occur only within this Atlantic Community framework”.
14 
 
    Nonetheless, throughout the 1990s the bilateral relationship overcame or 
postponed difficulties about the consensus of the “New World Order”. Encouraging 
facts have nourished some voices less skeptical about the future of this bilateral 
relationship. Joseph Nye has replied to Mearsheimer and Walt’s point of view arguing 
that “to venture a prediction of what US-European relations will look like a decade from 
now, it is more likely that they will fundamentally resemble the current state of relations 
rather than be radically different”.
15  
 
    Nye responds to Walt’s view saying that a) NATO and the U.S. have redesigned 
their objectives, b) trade inevitably produces some degree of friction, and c) there are 
some important channels of communication between both parties.  Nye’s perspective 
seems more congruent with the scope of the present essay, although Walt’s arguments 
should be considered as a possible future trend of the bilateral relationship. In support of 
a less conflictive perspective of the bilateral relationship, Zbigniew Brzezinski states 
that the U.S. does not fear the emergence of a rival (the EU), because 1) integration has 
not reflected unification as the ultimate goal of the European process, 2) Europe will 
grow horizontally (enlargement-amalgamation) rather than vertically, 3) the creation of 
the ESDP does not represent a threat to NATO and, 4) NATO and the EU should 
enlarge at the same time.
16  
 
 
EU Foreign Policy in the Making and U.S. Foreign Policy  
 
In order to analyze the bilateral transatlantic agenda, a description of the different 
natures of both foreign policies as well as their most recent achievements are essential 
for the analysis. There are three main features to be considered. The first is that foreign 
policy is one of the most sensitive areas of the Westphalian version of the state. 
However, as a second aspect, the European integration process has forced an advance in 
the coordination of 15 states’ foreign policies, particularly at the end of the 1990s. And 
third, up to now, while the United States maintains the Westphalia model in foreign 
policy, in the EU there is a redefinition of the still strong state capabilities level and the 
attributes of the regional institutional level. Regardless of the confusion between the 
                                                           
14 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) and 
Christopher Layne, “The ‘posterchild’ for Offensive Realism: United States as Global Hegemon”, Paper 
presented at The Miami Theory Group, November 30, 2001. 
15 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The US and Europe: Continental Drift?” International Affairs 72, I (2000), p. 59. 
16 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living With a New Europe," The National Interest (Summer 2000), pp. 17-33. 
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state and the regional level resulting from the speed of the transformations, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda constitutes the recognition of the EU as interlocutor aside from 
the European states.  
 
 
Is there an EU Foreign Policy? 
 
Since the Treaty of the European Community of Coal and Steel was signed, the number 
and capabilities of the countries involved in the integration process have grown. It is not 
an isolated fact that the European integration has increased its members from six to 
fifteen in five decades, and considering the current enlargement process, to possibly 
more than 27 by 2010. Enlargements are not only the expansion of a regional 
organization, they also represent a free decision of the applicant members to be part of 
the benefits of integration, although sometimes the social, political, and economic prices 
of the transformation are costly in the short term.  
 
In comparison to U.S. foreign policy, the external relations of the EU have 
characteristics that set them apart from traditional state foreign policy. The external 
relations of the EU have two sides of the same coin. On one side, the EU shows the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is basically intergovernmental. 
The CFSP as such was established in 1991, institutionalizing a common policy for the 
Union within a single framework.  CFSP’s objectives as clarified by the Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1997, are to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, 
independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN 
Charter; strengthen the security of the EU; preserve peace and international security; 
promote international cooperation; and develop and consolidate democracy and the rule 
of law, with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
17 On the other hand, 
the EU works as a supranational entity through its external trade policy led by the 
Commission, although constrained by the decisions of the Council of the EU. To make 
the picture more complex, there is a vivid and permanent debate between governments 
and the Commission, which is based on the struggle for competences.  
 
From a conceptual point of view, it has been argued that European foreign 
policy has presented a challenge to traditional foreign policy analysis, particularly to the 
dominant realist view with its state-centric focus.  Since the EU is not a state, the 
argument follows, the value of foreign policy analysis tied to state-centric realism is 
limited in the analysis of European foreign policy.  At the same time, the focus on EU 
foreign policy – as advanced by institutionalist perspectives – is also inadequate because 
while covering the cooperative or integrative behavior at the European level, it 
downgrades the significance of the different foreign policies of the member states, 
which are not regarded as part of European foreign policy.  Instead, a more 
comprehensive definition of European foreign policy would include Community foreign 
policy, which includes the Common Commercial Policy and trade and development 
issues; Union foreign policy, with its more “political” focus; and national foreign 
policies of the member states.  As Brian White suggests, a framework more suitable for 
the analysis of European foreign policy would focus on interrelated elements – actors, 
processes, issues, instruments, context, and outputs – that constitute a foreign policy 
system in action.  This more eclectic and interdisciplinary approach, White argues, 
provides a new research agenda as well as augments the more established approaches in 
                                                           
17 European Commission.  (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm) 
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the discipline.
18 While the Community foreign policy, which essentially constitutes 
foreign economic policy, can be called truly “common,” the CFSP is by no means 
“common” in the same way: it is developed intergovernmentally and it is not seen as a 
substitute for national foreign policies. 
 
When the external relations of the EU are evaluated in view of their leverage on 
international relations, they have been explained in the following way: "while the 
prospectus of EU becoming a major military superpower is uncertain, its status as an 
economic superpower is no longer in doubt".
19 The problem of these two parallel facts 
is that they are part of the same integration process and have to be coordinated. The 
pulling tendency is that as more commitments are made (within the fifteen countries 
toward integration), the greater is the need for building a common external identity to 
the world.  
 
With regard to security-military issues, the reluctance of individual states to give 
up their power is reflected in the slow and tenuous development of CFSP, which is one 
of the three pillars of the EU.
20 Unlike pillar one (supranational), the CFSP (pillar two, 
intergovernmental) is less supranational in implementing a common policy on a given 
issue in this area. Legally, one could think that the division between the first and the 
second pillar is clear. The EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, has 
stated “the Commission has no competence and no ambition in the military area”.
21 
Nonetheless, the daily performance of the EU shows that this bifurcation is extremely 
connected. Commissioner Patten has also stated “in order to have an operational and 
effective policy of security and defense, it needs the support of complementary bases... 
The Commission has an important role to play in promoting a favorable environment in 
Europe... there will always be a substantial non-military component before, during and 
after a crisis”.
22 
 
The above argument explains why the Commission’s role in the performance of 
the CFSP development is crucial in providing coherence to the external relations of the 
European Union.  Thus, the external relations of the EU have two parallel paths 
extremely linked (intergovernmental and supranational) and both have to complement 
each other. In a way, the EU is in fact a security community that presents some features 
of amalgamated (communitarian policies) and pluralistic (CFSP) societies.  
 
Perhaps the greater danger perceived by the United States, is that the CFSP will 
become sufficiently binding to the EU member states by the “lowest common 
denominator”, so that it will prevent them from bilateral initiatives with the US, while 
simultaneously the EU will remain an ineffective partner on the world stage.
23 
                                                           
18 Brian White, “The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis,” European Journal of International 
Relations 5, 1 (1999), pp. 37-66. 
19 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union. A Concise Introduction (New York: Saint 
Martin Press, 1999), p. 214.  
20 John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 
282. 
21 Christopher Patten, “The Future of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Role of 
the European Commission. Conference on the Development of a Common European Security and 
Defence Policy –The Integration of the New Decade,” (Berlin, December 16 1999), p. 6.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Mark Nelson and John G. Ikenberry, Atlantic Frontiers: A New Agenda for US-EC Relations  
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993) qtd. in A New Era in US-EU Relations? The Clinton 
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Furthermore, the institutional complexities of the EU and the overlapping competencies 
result in time-consuming and painstaking decision-making processes, aimed at 
achieving unanimity. However, it should be considered that in the Amsterdam Treaty a 
mechanism known as “constructive abstention” was devised. According to Martin 
Walker, “constructive abstention could become a legitimate excuse for the absence of 
such as common policy, since, in effect, nations states would be acting for reasons of 
national interest rather than European interest… Still, for all its complications, the 
Amsterdam Treaty does make coherent European foreign policy possible and its 
implementations practicable, without subjecting the Union to the stresses and 
frustrations imposed by the old rule of unanimous approval”.
24   
 
The complex bureaucratic mechanism in Brussels lends to the conclusion that 
“the Maastricht structure might almost have been designed to make a common foreign 
policy almost impossible.”
25  Finally, from the U.S. perspective, the CFSP is unlikely to 
become a strong force mainly because the foreign and security policies of the member 
states differ considerably and are unlikely to be relinquished to a significant degree.
26 
 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Although viewpoints differ about the durability of the present situation, one of the 
prevailing assumptions is that the United States has emerged as a hegemon in a 
militarily unipolar and economically multipolar world.  Much of the debate is between 
those who believe that American interests and security are best preserved through 
international balance and accommodation, and those who seek global prevalence and 
hegemony.  The preponderance of the U.S. has given it a tremendous freedom of action 
along with the realization that there is less to be gained on the international stage, thus, 
reinforcing the unilateralist and isolationist segments within the political establishment.  
 
The process of foreign policy making in the United States involves rational 
behavior by actors, bureaucratic politics, as well as public opinion. For example, the 
current Administration so far has shown a remarkable degree of divergence in 
statements made by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State.  In 
addition to pressures from interests groups, U.S. policies are likely to be affected mainly 
by two factors: public opinion changes in the long run and, most importantly, 
Congressional changes.   
  
Despite its low interest in foreign affairs, the U.S. Congress has become more 
assertive on what are considered to be national security issues, affecting the ability of 
the executive branch to pursue new initiatives and exert strong international leadership. 
To some extent, this circumstance could strengthen the isolationist position of the US 
not only in the public opinion, but also in the view of some decision-makers. If one 
takes into account the role of the U.S. Congress it is possible to identify this local 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda ed. Anthony Laurence Gardner, (Brookfield: Ashgate, 
1999), p. 26. 
24 Martin Walker, “The Future of Europe’s Foreign Policy” in Europe in the New Century. Visions of an 
Emerging Superpower ed. Robert Guttman (Boulder Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 74.  
25 Edward Mortimer, “Euro-structures Under One Roof” The Financial Times 3 May 1995  qtd. in 
Gardner, p.  27; Nouray Ibryamova, “US-EU Relationship: US perspective”, unpublished paper, May 
2000.  
26  Martin Walker, “The New European Strategic Relationship,” World Policy Journal 16, 2 (1999), p. 26.  
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proclivity. “Two-thirds of the Republicans elected to Congress in 1994 reportedly did 
not have passports, and Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) has proudly declared 
that he has no need to visit Europe because he has already been there once”.
27 
 
Congress is more likely to sustain cooperation with the EU on issues such as 
non-proliferation, terrorism, and international crime, but less willing to do so on many 
humanitarian issues.  Moreover, it sees multilateral efforts as a way for the United 
States to lose its decision-making prerogatives while keeping all the costs.  Evidence for 
the pitfalls of that can be found in the words of the former Secretary of State Albright, 
namely, that “when Europe does less, it provides a rationale for Congress to do less, 
which may cause Europe to slow down even further.  This is a cycle that leads to 
disaster”.
28 Other factors contributing to the negative influence of the legislative branch 
include the role of party affiliations and “cohabitation” with the administration.  In sum, 
while Europe continues to occupy a favored place in US national security, new 
commitments are less likely to be taken on unless they are perceived as high national 
security stakes.
29 
 
One of the most important ways in which Congress can influence foreign policy 
is through the provision – or lack thereof – of financial resources.  The number of 
experts on the EU in any administration has been limited to several dozen spread out 
between the various agencies, including the State Department, National Security 
Council (NSC), and the CIA.  This number went down further during the Clinton 
Administration, when the White House budget and staff, including the NSC, underwent 
a cutback of one-quarter.  This serious understaffing was partially solved by reliance on 
short-term detachments of Foreign Service Officers and military and civilian personnel 
from the Pentagon, most of whom had professional experience in politics and security, 
but not economics or trade.  Thus, their orientation tended to be more NATO-centric 
than EU-centric.  In addition, several political appointees brought their perspectives on 
the EU dating from their experiences under the Carter Administration, and therefore, 
quite outdated.
30    
 
The Clinton Administration made two specific moves in order to face the 
challenges caused by the emergence of a European foreign policy. The first was to 
impel NATO enlargement for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The second 
was that “the United States agreed that NATO assets could be used for purely European 
operations that did not require U.S. troops, under the formula that European missions 
and forces would be ‘separable but not separate’ from NATO”.
31 
 
Even though it is early to forecast possible trends of the new Bush 
Administration attitude towards Europe, it is feasible to speculate that taking into 
account the magnitude of the relationship, Europe will continue to be at the top of the 
agenda. When the Bush Administration entered office in 2001, the U.S. economy was 
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on the verge of recession and the first military action was taken jointly with the United 
Kingdom against Iraq, provoking disagreements from France, since it was not 
previously notified. However, this first message to the international community as well 
as the “new division of labor” supported by the Bush presidential campaign seems to 
have waned with regard to the more prudent and credible statements made by Secretary 
of State Colin Powell
32 in the sense that any withdrawal from the Balkans will be 
subject to extensive consultations with Europe. 
 
The new Bush Administration brought with it an easily discernible realist 
agenda, abandoning the neoliberal institutionalist approach adopted by the Clinton 
Administration.  Although it is early to draw conclusions, the Bush Administration 
appears to fall into what Robert Zoellick described as the principles of Republican 
foreign policy, which essentially is a neorealist framework.  For instance, we have seen 
more emphasis on power in military terms, i.e., strengthening military capabilities in 
pursuit of perceived national interests.  Further, as was suggested by the Secretaries of 
State and Defense, NATO is seen as the bedrock of the relations with Europe; there are 
signs that the ESDP is looked upon negatively, while burden-sharing is emphasized.  It 
should be noted, however that the last argument has widespread, bipartisan support and 
it is not strictly related to party affiliation. In fact, during the Clinton Administration 
Congress regularly demanded more burden-sharing by the EU and other international 
organizations, accompanied by vociferous critique of the United Nations, effectively 
putting the advancement of common interests on the willingness of “Europe to take on 
greater responsibilities.”
33 The recent withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, and 
unilateralist tendencies in general,
34 are likely to further increase the tensions with the 
European allies.  There are signs that with the end of the Cold War, the United States 
became less attentive to the sensitivities of its allies, which in turn results in a sense of 
resentment from its European counterparts, leading to increasing frictions in trade and 
defense.
35 This tendency of the United States to be a “more circumspect and more self-
centered partner” has been one of the arguments in support of strengthening the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.
36 
 
 
Strengthening Diplomatic Relations: NTA 
 
EU external relations as well as U.S. foreign policy were under a period of redefinition 
during the early 1990s. Whereas both actors were planning their own strategies towards 
different regions of the world, the North Atlantic relationship also demanded new 
mechanisms to face the end of the Cold War. 
 
Facing the arrival of the Clinton Administration as well as its anxiety to 
conclude the North American Free Trade Agreement and strengthen the relations with 
the Pacific Basin, the EU called for negotiations of the Transatlantic Free Trade 
Agreement.  This initiative was not achieved because of the complexity of the 
bargaining process, but it could also be interpreted as the diminishing role of the WTO 
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36 Alasdair Smith and Helen Wallace, “The European Union: Towards a Policy for Europe,” International 
Affairs 70, 3 (1994) pp. 436-7. 
  12     
in international trade. As an alternative, Leon Brittan proposed the highly flexible 
framework of a Transatlantic Economic Zone.
37 
 
As a result of these initiatives and in order to formalize the relations, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was signed in 1995.  It outlines four areas for cooperation: 
a) peace, stability, democracy and development, b) responsiveness to global challenges 
relating to issues such as environment, terrorism, and international crime, c) world 
trade, and d) bridge-building across the Atlantic in cultural and educational domains.
38 
 
To some extent, the NTA constitutes an umbrella of negotiations where the U.S. 
and the EU share the same goals on foreign policy, at least in rhetorical and diplomatic 
terms. It also facilitates the bilateral relations since it is less complex to reach a 
consensus between two parties (US-Commission) than among seventeen (US-
Commission and 15 EU countries). Nonetheless, in practice some problems arise when 
the means to meet these goals differ and when the EU is not able to reach a common 
position.
39 In addition, NTA has an obvious weakness because it does not include two 
important areas of the bilateral agenda: monetary and security issues.  
 
Monetary aspects of the relationship have fallen to the way side because the U.S. 
prefers to deal with them under the G-7 agenda, yet it should reconsider this position 
because of the strong bilateral trade relations. Even though the euro currency has 
gradually been devalued, there is still uncertainty about the future trends on monetary 
issues. Nonetheless, the euro calmed down financial speculations during the Asian crisis 
and it is expected to be a primary reserve currency in the future and a key player in 
addressing global financial problems. Security issues, on the other hand, are still 
delicate and undefined areas, addressed in the NTA only for cooperation to fight 
terrorism and international crime. 
 
Aside from the governmental initiatives to improve the bilateral relation, there is 
a driving force to boost bilateral communication through the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), in which a business-driven vision of transatlantic commerce can be 
developed and specific recommendations for removing barriers devised. In addition, the 
TABD has played a crucial role in completing the Customs Cooperation and Mutual 
Administrative Assistance Agreement and an Anti-Bribery Agreement. Thus, the TABD 
has become a relevant actor in the mutual relation as Franklin Vergo points out: "No 
other forum has risen so rapidly to become as affective as the TABD. It has become the 
single most important channel through which business can influence the bilateral trade 
and commercial agenda of the U.S. Government and the European Commission".
40 To 
some extent, the TABD showcases the communication between transnational groups as 
part of the networks of the pluralistic security community. 
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Economic Dynamic: There is not a Lonely Superpower 
 
The U.S.-EU trade relations draw the attention of scholars from both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean due to the magnitude of bilateral exchanges as well as several turbulent 
current disputes. When the transatlantic trade relationship is evaluated considering 
exclusively   press news, the outcome may be sort of pessimistic. The press does not 
always report good news or normal economic performances. Fortunately, if the bilateral 
trade issues were quantitatively assessed, the result would show that disputes should not 
be overestimated, since they represent a very small share of the transatlantic trade, less 
than 2 per cent.
41  
 
Trade is a key ingredient in international relations because societies interact and 
develop links not only in terms of merchandise, but also through culture and customs. 
The United States and the EU share the basic premises of the relevance of trade and the 
best indicator of this is represented in the 500 billion dollars in annual trade between 
both parties. Thus, considering the magnitude of normal and day-to-day trade exchanges 
and the scale of commercial disputes, it could be assumed that trade has strengthened 
the transatlantic economic regime, which is mostly stable.  
 
Within this framework of stable mutual commercial exchanges, the bilateral 
relationship has undergone several transformations during the five decades of the 
European integration process. Particularly, there is a constant distribution and creation 
of economic capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. Featherstone and Ginsberg 
identify three periods in the U.S.-EU economic relationship since 1945.
42 The first is 
from the aftermath of World War II to the mid-1960s and is characterized by U.S. 
economic dominance and the steady recovery of European economies. The second 
includes the period from 1966 to 1986, when the U.S. experienced a relative economic 
decline in comparison with the ascent of Europe, Japan, and other Asian economies. 
During this period, the United States became the world’s largest debtor, enhanced 
protectionist practices (Section 301 of the U.S. Trading Act), and was less tolerant 
towards the EC trade restrictions. The third period began in 1986 with a relative 
economic balance between the U.S. and the EU. Two major events characterize this 
period: the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations and the launch of the Single 
European Act. Whereas the former represented a mutual commitment to open markets 
through multilateral mechanisms, the latter was the firm objective of the EC to reach the 
internal market by 1992.
43 Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s the transatlantic trade 
relationship involved two actors with similar economic capabilities: the United States 
and the European Union. 
 
In addition to the structural changes in both economies, the institutional 
architecture of the EU provides the European Commission the instruments to represent 
the fifteen countries on trade issues. In comparison with other aspects of the European 
integration, trade is one of the areas in which the EU talks with a single voice. Despite 
the fact that trade in services or trade-related aspects are still national competencies, the 
                                                           
41 Pascal Lamy, “Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, addresses Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD)”, Brussels, May 23, 2000 (http://europa.eu.int/comm./trade/speeches_articles/spla21_en.htm) 
42 Kevin Featherstone and Roy Ginsberg, The United States and the European Union in the 1990’s: 
Partners in Transition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 
43 Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, “Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical 
Perspective,” in Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, ed. Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. 
Shaffer (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), pp. 7-17.  
  14     
Commission’s competence to negotiate and conclude international trade agreements 
provides the EU with a stronger voice and more articulated performances when a 
position with regard to international trade issues has to be taken. Thus, both increasing 
structural economic capabilities and institutional developments make the EU a strong 
partner in the transatlantic relationship. 
 
In analyzing the bilateral trade dynamics, at least five main characteristics can 
be identified. The first is that this trade relationship emerges from the premise that both 
actors have intense economic exchanges resulting from their high production capacity.  
In terms of world trade, 38% in merchandise and 42% in services is exchanged between 
the EU and the United States.
44 Thus, taking into account the large bilateral trade 
dimension, the emergence of disagreements and frictions are to be expected.  
 
Derived from the preceding paragraph, the second feature is related to the 
dichotomy between disputes and arrangements on trade relations. Not only are trade 
disputes characteristic of commercial relations, but also their resolutions. Despite the 
fact that some trade disputes have convoluted negotiations (bananas, genetically 
modified organism or foreign sales tax corporation), there is an ongoing process for 
overcoming disputes in the U.S.-EU relationship. Sooner or later, trade disputes will be 
solved in a satisfactory or unsatisfactory way and new disputes will emerge. The 
umbrella of the international trade regime, assured by bilateral and multilateral (WTO) 
mechanisms, is vital to keeping a degree of order and mutual confidence in the 
transatlantic relationship. 
  
The third characteristic is that any dispute between the EU and the U.S. has a 
direct impact on international trade as a whole. To a great extent, the performance of 
both parties in the current and coming disputes on tariffs, quotas, extraterritoriality of 
laws, regulatory issues, and information revolution,
45 exert pressure on the international 
trade system because of the economic power concentrated in the transatlantic area and 
the magnitude of mutual trade exchanges. In fact, the beginning and conclusion of 
international trade rounds within the WTO are mostly determined by the agreement 
between the two trade partners. This assumption can be clearly corroborated by the role 
played by the United States and to a lesser extent the EU in the processes of the 
accession of China to WTO, the launch of the Doha Round in 2001 or the probable 
upcoming negotiations to accept Russia in the WTO.  
 
As a fourth point it might be said that although mutual trade is highly 
significant, both parties are also competitors in the international trade arena. For the 
United States, the relations with NAFTA countries and the Pacific Rim remain very 
relevant, whereas for the EU trade with its central and eastern neighbors has become a 
priority over the past decade. Thus, there is a twofold process in this relation. On one 
hand, both parties have fostered and institutionalized (WTO and NTA) their mutual 
relations throughout the 1990s. On the other, they are competitors in establishing free 
trade agreements or any other sort of arrangements for opening new markets, especially 
in Asia and Latin America. This regional strife can be observed in the initiatives of both 
parties in those regions: EU-MERCOSUR, EU-Mexico or EU-China relations, on one 
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side, and NAFTA as well as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, on the other, 
are examples of this tendency.   
 
Finally, as a fifth point, it could be said that the development of mutual 
consultation bodies at different levels has had an important effect on preventing or 
solving some trade problems without resorting to the WTO. The intergovernmental 
level (heads of governments) is supplemented by transnational contacts (officials and 
competition authorities) as well as transnational private cooperation (Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue).
46 Recently, at the governmental level, both parties agreed to replace 
“Megaphone Diplomacy” by “Telephone Diplomacy” in order to settle all trade disputes 
on a case-by-case basis under WTO rules,
47 avoiding the contamination of the trade 
agenda as a whole. Although this could sound rhetorical, at least in the official speech it 
seems that there is a good will to bilaterally solve trade differences. 
 
Although there is a pending agenda to enhance the transparency and reform of 
the WTO dispute settlement procedures, so far the WTO establishes the commitments 
and obligations to be respected in international trade, and constitutes an improvement in 
comparison with the GATT scheme. With the crucial participation of the United States 
and the EU, the transformation of the GATT into the WTO reflects a gradual 
transformation of the traditionally “power-oriented” international trade relations into 
“rule-oriented” policies under international organizations, namely, the WTO. To some 
extent, the “rule-oriented” approach enhances predictability and legal security, limiting 
the risk of abuse of power characteristic of the “power-oriented” perspective.
48 Thus, 
the Dispute Settlements Body establishes panels for solving disputes, which may arise 
among the WTO members, and diminishes and punishes unilateral actions. 
 
The best example of the shift from the “power-” to “rule-” oriented approach in 
international trade is the creation of the WTO, which has been requested to solve 
disputes on more occasions than its predecessor, the GATT. Petersmann states that since 
the time the EC Treaty became effective in 1958 until 1980, “the EC initiated only four 
dispute settlement proceedings under GATT Article XXIII as a complainant (three 
against the United States) but was a respondent in fourteen Article XXIII GATT dispute 
settlement proceedings (five of which were initiated by the United States)”.
49 Consistent 
with the transformations of the economic role of both the United States and the EU in  
international trade relations, unilateral foreign barriers challenged the economic system 
more frequently, and the percentage of total GATT cases in which the EC was a 
complainant doubled in the 1980s. Interestingly, the U.S. used Section 301 less against 
the EC than in the case of Japan and the Asian economies.
50 After a period of mutual 
complaints, in 1992 the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (a never-ending 
nightmare for trade specialists) made possible the Blair House Agreement, which 
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provided for gradual reduction and limitation of agricultural subsidies.
51 In the medium 
term, this agreement facilitated the way to the creation of the WTO in 1995. In 
comparison to the GATT, in the period 1995-2000 the WTO has established 24 panels 
in which the EU is a complainant and 11 in which it is defendant.
52 
 
Derived from the intense trade relationship, the scope of frictions, issues and 
cases is broad and complex. In order to have an initial image of the trade disputes, at 
least two classifications can be made. The first is elaborated with reference to the WTO: 
many of the trade conflicts have been submitted before the WTO (issues concerning 
bananas, beef hormone and taxes on U.S. corporations), others maintain a low to 
medium profile (Helms-Burton Act, D’Amato Act and Airbus), whereas others are 
taking some shape (Carousel Law). The second classification is based on the nature of 
the conflicts and can be divided into trade disputes in a non-tariff-cultural area (data 
protection, food safety and quality, aircraft noise hushkits) and in a classical commercial 
one (banana, FSC).  
 
The attempt to analyze the whole trade dispute transatlantic agenda goes beyond 
the aims of this paper. Each case is relevant by itself and would include among others: 
Section 110 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act; Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act; 
Section 306 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, and Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000. However, due to the high profile of the issue involved, the number of 
actors affected or amount of the retaliations allowed, a selection of cases may illustrate 
the current trade disputes in the transatlantic relationship: bananas, steel, foreign sales 
corporation, and genetically modified crops.  
 
In some cases, both parties follow a similar pattern when a dispute arises. Once 
the interest groups or the sector affected exerts pressure on a government, that party 
interprets the WTO regulations according to its own interests, and appeals to public 
opinion that its unilateral actions are supported by the legality of international trade. 
Subsequently, if the confrontation is not solved bilaterally, the WTO rules inconsistency 
of one of the parties. At that point, the party affected by the WTO’s decision usually 
postpones or insufficiently modifies the domestic regulations to restore the normalcy of 
the trade system in the specific issue. However, each case has its own particular 
development. 
 
The banana conflict is one of the most quoted cases in the literature on 
transatlantic relations. The banana divergence emerged as a result of the EU’s system of 
quotas for banana imports established on July 1, 1993. The EU import regime gave 
preference to bananas from ACP countries under the Lome Convention, affecting U.S. 
multinationals (Dole and Chiquita), which have banana operations in Latin America. 
Under the rules of the GATT, the United States won two judgments, “but because that 
institution could not enforce its rulings, the EU was able to ignore them”.
53  The U.S., 
jointly with Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, and Mexico requested the 
establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel. In April 1999, the WTO panel ruled 
that the EU’s banana regime continued to be inconsistent with WTO rules, and 
compensation in the amount of $191.4 million was awarded in favor of the U.S. for lost 
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banana sales. Thus, the U.S. imposed tariffs equivalent to the same amount, which 
affected imports from Europe of Scottish cashmere sweaters, Italian hams, and pecorino 
cheese, among others commodities.
54 
  
Under the Bush Administration, another case has been in the headlines. 
Although there was some evidence of probable divergences on the steel sector at the 
beginning of the new century, this issue became a trade dispute in the bilateral 
relationship in 2002. Pascal Lamy has reminded that during the 1990s European steel 
sector restructuring was not based on direct intervention but instead on a package of 
measures to encourage capacity reductions. The result was that in the period 1992-1996 
this sector underwent a sharp reduction in volume, limited government intervention, and 
kept the market open.
55 On the other hand, the U.S. steel firms faced difficulties during 
the 1990s, and they decided to postpone a reform in the “European style”. Thus, by the 
end of 2001 the International Trade Commission recommended to President Bush to 
impose tariffs on foreign steel. The President raised safeguard tariffs up to 30% on 
March 20, 2002, which were not applied to Mexico and Canada, both NAFTA 
members. From the European perspective, President Bush’s decision is making others 
pay for American steel sector reform. In order to prevent a flood of steel imports being 
diverted into the European market as a result of President’s Bush decision, the EU 
established quotas with regard to 2001 import levels within which steel imports will be 
treated as normal, and beyond those limits imports will be subject to additional tariffs of 
14.9 – 26 percent. With regard to the United States, the EU considered imposing tariffs 
on a list of export products coming from sensitive electoral districts to President Bush, 
from textiles (affecting North Carolina) to Tropicana orange juice (hurting Florida).
56 
This probable retaliation reflects a better understanding by the EU of the complex 
decision making process in the United States as well as the best and most effective way 
to exert pressure on key areas of the American political system. At the same time, it 
showcases that domestic politics are not constrained at the border anymore. 
 
The U.S. export subsidies under the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation 
Replacement Act is one of the top issues on the bilateral dispute agenda. This topic is 
particularly relevant due to both the calculated amount of damages that reaches around 
$4 billion, and the modification in the domestic tax system of the United States on this 
issue demanded by the WTO. This scheme provides for an exemption from the general 
rules established in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, which results in substantial savings 
to U.S. companies. This mechanism allows hundreds of U.S. companies, including 
Boeing, Microsoft, Eastman Kodak, Cisco, Motorola, General Motors, and about 7,000 
other firms doing business overseas to save billions of dollars each year.
57 It is 
estimated that in 1999, some U.S. companies using legally sanctioned offshore tax 
heavens like the Virgin Islands, Barbados and Guam saved 4.5 billion dollars.
58 This 
estimated damage is considered as one of the highest in the short life of the WTO since 
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this quantity "is a sum almost 10 times greater the trade impact of banana, beef 
hormone, and aircraft hushkit disputes combined".
59 On January 14, 2002, the WTO 
confirmed that the FSC Replacement Act was incompatible with the WTO.
60 
  
Genetically modified (GM) food has arisen as one of the most complex dispute 
areas in the U.S.-EU relationship because it involves differences that go beyond strictly 
economic matters. The treatment of GM foods reflects “broader differences in 
regulatory cultures and safety laws on either side of the Atlantic”
61 as well as different 
food cultures. The U.S. food safety laws are organized around scientific methods of risk 
assessment by independent regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration. In the case of the EU, the participation of different levels of governance 
in the policy making frequently produces delays and contradictions in their 
performances. National governments often take into account social factors as well as 
scientific assessments in making the food regulation. At the community level, the EU 
regulation in this area is relatively recent because it was not until January 2000 when 
the Commission proposed both the adoption of more than 80 new measures to integrate 
the food regulation of products and the creation of a European Food Authority. 
  
In the same area of modified food, the export of U.S hormone-treated beef to 
Europe has been a major trade dispute. In 1995, the United States took legal action 
against the EU before the WTO, arguing that the EU’s ban on U.S. hormone-treated 
beef was inconsistent with the 1994 WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures.
62 The WTO agreed with the United States that the EU’s 
ban constituted a disguised barrier to international trade. The United States retaliated on 
May 17, 1999, with tariffs of $116.8 million against specific EU products such as foie 
de gras, Roquefort cheese, and Dijon mustard. However, the situation worsened in 1999 
when U.S. beef imports claiming to be hormone-free were found to contain hormones.
63 
 
With regard to GM crops, Pollack and Shaffer consider that by 1999, about 57% 
of soybeans, 50% of cotton, and 50% of corn grown in the United States was from GM 
seeds. Despite the increasing role of these products, and unlike the meat hormone 
disputes, the United States has avoided bringing a WTO claim over the EU restrictions 
on GM products basically due to for four reasons: a) U.S. recognition of European 
consumer opinion and the potential of a populist backlash, b) spillover effects of EU 
policy in the United States, c) fallout of the anti-WTO Seattle demonstrations, and d) 
the January 2000 Biosafety Protocol.
64 
 
The unilateral extraterritoriality of laws is a major risk to the multilateral trade 
system. It represents the imposition of one perspective as well as non-recognition of 
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other trade partners in the international arena. Supported by its hegemonic role in 
international affairs, the United States has tried to use the extraterritoriality of laws, but 
has been unsuccessful. During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration tried to impose 
sanctions on European firms participating in the construction of a then-Soviet gas 
pipeline to Europe. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act (known as Helms-Burton) and the Iran and Libya Act 
(known as the D’Amato Act), which clearly represent the use of trade as a means to 
achieve political objectives. Both acts require the U.S. to impose sanctions on foreign 
investors in Cuba and the Iranian and Libyan energy industries, respectively. However, 
the EU has consistently opposed the extraterritorial nature of laws, and exerted 
pressures on the United States to reconsider its unilateralist position. After several 
rounds of negotiations, the EU has held back from asking the WTO to rule on this issue, 
while the U.S. administration has waived the application of sanctions to European 
companies.
65 Despite their evident effectiveness, unilateral sanctions against such 
popular targets as Iran, Libya and Cuba offered a seemingly low-cost way to express 
moral disapproval and, for the Congress, to assert control over foreign policy. In both 
cases, Europeans objected to what they termed extraterritorial measures that sought to 
impose not only U.S. moral standards but explicit U.S. policy decisions on others.
66 
 
  Trade is highly linked to investment.  The main tendencies of trade were 
described above, highlighting the fact that trade disputes constitute a low percentage of 
bilateral exchanges. Foreign Direct Investment presents fewer difficulties than the trade 
sector. At least more than 7 million jobs in both economies depend directly on mutual 
investments as each other’s largest trading partners.
67  
  
The growing role of Asian and Latin American markets has modified some of 
the U.S. and EU’s trade strategies. Nonetheless, the EU continues to be in a prominent 
position in terms of trade and FDI. For instance, in 1998, EU companies accounted for 
$482 billion, approximately 59% of FDI in the U.S., while about 44% of total American 
FDI was in the EU member states ($434 billion). In comparison, Asian firms accounted 
for only 21% of FDI in the U.S., and only 18% of U.S. FDI was invested in Asia.
68 
  
According to Alberta Sbragia, "the investment relationship between the United 
States and Europe remained the most important in the world".
69 U.S. FDI in Europe 
grew 200% from 1972 to 1985; U.S. firms have managed to create consortia with their 
European counterparts; as a result, more than 2,600,000 jobs depend on U.S. firms. On 
the other hand, European investment in the U.S. grew at a rapid pace towards the end of 
the 1980s and Japanese investment is far surpassed by the EU when taken as a whole. 
The end-result of such cross-regional mutual investments is that a more symmetrical 
relationship in this issue exists.
70 The EU is the first foreign investor in 38 U.S. states 
and the second in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, and the third in eighth states 
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(Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Vermont).
71 
  
Similarly to trade, the flows of FDI have undergone changes since the end of  
World War II. The flow of transatlantic investment is no longer a one-way street as in 
the 1950s or 1960s. Thus, between 1977 and 1984, total FDI in the United States grew 
almost fivefold (from $34.6 billion to $156.6) with European firms in the lead.
72 
Basically, the United States has faced an economic multipolarity since the seventies, 
and the case of FDI is not the exception. The U.S. raised its interest rates to finance its 
burgeoning deficit, which drew in massive amounts of foreign capital. In other words, 
since the 1970s, the U.S. became more dependent on foreign economic exchange than 
ever before in its recent history.  
  
Despite those relative vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy, mutual investments 
continue to have high dynamism in the transatlantic economic relationship. Investments 
assure agreements on trade issues, and in consequence, diminish disputes. Mark A. 
Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer assert “As firms increasingly ‘transatlanticize’ their 
production activities, the prospects for transatlantic coordination and harmonization 
rise. Already, trade disputes are rare in sectors in which dominant corporations have 
significant investments on each side of the Atlantic, such as the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors.”
73 
  
The capabilities of the United States and the European Union have changed 
since the end of WWII. Nowadays, when the transatlantic relationship is analyzed, both 
actors come to the front to defend their economic interest and the outcome seems 
balanced. However, as will be described in the following section, the capabilities in 
terms of security tell us a different story. 
 
 
The Assessment of Security Issues 
 
The security architecture in Europe is quite complex in view of a broader concept of 
security that has demanded coordinated actions from several regional organizations. 
More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, there is an inter-institutional dialogue 
among EU, NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization of   
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations are nowadays 
connected by different channels: the WEU links the EU and NATO through the 
Petersburg Tasks; the Stability Pact, initiated and run by the EU, has been turned over to 
the OSCE for review and implementation; NATO’s Euroatlantic Partnership for Peace 
Program aims at improving the capabilities of states in undergoing military 
transformation within the OSCE space. In consequence, a new inter-institutional 
security framework has emerged in Europe, providing norms and rules for the 
transatlantic security community. 
 
                                                           
71 European Commission Delegation to the United States, European Union and the 50 US States: 
Economic Cooperation Across the Atlantic, Washington, December 2001 (http://eurunion 
.org/partner/usstates/usstates.htm) 
72 Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, “Transatlantic Governance in Historical and Theoretical 
Perspective,” p. 11-12. 
73 Ibid, p. 14. 
  21     
However, not all four regional organizations are relevant at the same level. 
Basically, both NATO and the EU are the most important. With the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc and Russia lining up to become members of the two most demanding 
Western institutions – the European Union and NATO – there finally appears to be a 
prospect of a “Europe whole and free.”  These developments have even led to 
speculations about the emergence of single security community on the continent, 
although its parameters and institutional dimensions remain unclear.  While NATO the 
main political and security organization on the continent - expanded eastward, the 
European Union is also taking steps toward the Europeanization of security 
arrangements on the continent. 
 
While NATO secures the United States’ commitment and influence on the 
defense of Western Europe, the power relationship between the transatlantic allies 
within the alliance is unbalanced.  In fact, only after more than a month of fighting in 
the aftermath of the September 11
th attacks, did the White House accept the allies’ 
offers of thousands of combat and support troops, and then only in limited members 
outside NATO’s chain of command. Thus, “the alliance’s formal participation is limited 
to the deployment of a handful of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
aircraft in the United States, and modest naval assets in the Middle East…. At the same 
time, Washington made clear that the counter terrorist campaign would be led by the 
United States, not NATO”.
74 
 
At the core of the debate, the geopolitical and geostrategic context of Europe has 
different connotations and interpretations for European and U.S. scholars.  After 
Maastricht, and especially in consideration of the Balkan wars during the 1990s, a 
perception of growing urgency has arisen in the transatlantic area captured in the view 
that "the entirety of the security relationship between Europe and North America must 
be rethought".
75 Pressures and demands about security issues, as well as strategic 
thinking are very different between Atlanticists and Europeanists. This is simply 
inevitable. A dominant trend in the U.S. perceives Europe in a geo-strategic perspective. 
For them, Europe is not an independent entity, but a component of a more complex 
definition: Eurasia, and for a strategist like Brzezinski, "the chief political prize".
76 For 
European scholars, the German-French alliance should move forward to a future 
geopolitics within such a space.  In view of the post-Cold War realities, supporters of 
the alliance – the “Atlanticist” countries – opposed the formation of close links between 
the EU and the WEU.  The “Europeanist” states, on the other hand, advocated the 
creation of European defense organization that would seek to neutralize a possible 
diminished role of the U.S. and possibly strengthen the alliance.  The Treaty on the 
European Union accommodated both sides by allowing for possible common foreign 
policy, which would lead to common defense, strengthening the European pillar of the 
alliance.
77  
 
Even though the CFSP is still under construction, at present time the High 
Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, is working on the European Union's 
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Defense Plan. The aim of Mr. Solana's work is to "build up a capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces in future regional crises like those in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, even if their biggest NATO ally, the United States, decided to stay 
out".
78 To some extent, the European Security and Defense Identity has moved some 
steps forward and there is a specific goal of creating a rapid reaction force of 60,000 
soldiers by 2003, as was decided in Cologne and Helsinki.  
 
While the EU is developing military capabilities, the U.S. has complained about 
the low European spending on the military.
79 Currently, the United States spends more 
than twice as much on its military as all other NATO allies combined ($343.2 billion in 
the fiscal year 2002 vs. roughly $170 billion for the allies, and which is more than 
Britain or France spends in a year).
80 Moreover, after September 11
th, it is likely that the 
military expenditures gap will increase, considering that the Bush Administration has 
provided an extra $48 billion on defense, in addition to America’s $331 billion defense 
budget. Aside from the national military budgets gap, new European investments are not 
focused on the most important areas. “The US budget is also divided among a handful 
of producers overseen by the Defense Department, whereas much of the spending by the 
rest of the NATO allies is lost in redundancies inherent in arming and operating 18 
separate military forces”.
81 In the American perspective, according to The Economist, 
the recent decision of the EU to invest 3.3 billion euros ($3 billion) in the satellite 
system Galileo, “deliberately and needlessly duplicates America’s Global Positioning 
System”.
82  
 
On the other hand, the decision making process in the EU sometimes hampers 
concrete actions. For instance, in order to carry out the commitments on Kosovo, the 
EU delayed for months the release of  $759 million that it originally promised.
83 The 
delay is part of the institutional problems of the EU, since many actions of the EU have 
to be approved by different institutional bodies  (European Council, Commission and 
European Parliament), which tends to be a lengthy process. In order to avoid more 
delays in the EU’s performance in this kind of international commitments, Chris Patten, 
Commissioner for External Relations, intends to create a “Rapid Reaction Facility” to 
mobilize financial and other resources within hours or days rather than weeks or 
months.  
 
The defense developments of the EU are part of the analysis of  U.S. strategists. 
At least in official speeches, there is a sort of schizophrenia
84 about the role of Europe 
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on security, supporting such advancements in principle, but in a wary fashion in order to 
preserve the stability in Europe on its own terms. After several adjustments provoked by 
the September 11
th attacks, experts on the relations with Europe have warned President 
Bush to continue the strategy followed by the Clinton Administration, in which the 
support for a peaceful Europe, undivided and democratic as a whole (EU, NATO, 
Russia and the Balkans simultaneously) was promoted in order to have Europe as a 
strong partner in the U.S. global agenda.
85 
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy is seen as a positive development by 
the United States - “providing, as it were, the State Department with a single number to 
call in Europe”
86 - despite two perceived dangers: “the common policy could be too 
effective: it could have a high ‘common denominator’ and might diverge from US 
objectives, thereby making them harder to achieve,” or it “might be not effective 
enough: it could further diminish the coherence and speed of Europe’s actions on the 
world stage.”
87 More specifically, the CFSP may become sufficiently binding on the 
member states to damage the bilateral channels with the individual countries through 
which the U.S. prefers to conduct its foreign and security policies.  The threat to the 
U.S. posed by the CFSP becoming too effective, however, remains largely theoretical at 
this point.  The second pillar of the EU is still in its infancy and for many in the United 
States it simply lacks credibility due not only to its inability to formulate high profile 
security policies but also because of its modest resources, lack of organizational 
identity, and inability to present a common face in Washington.   
 
The support for the creation of a unified European defense force remains 
contingent on it operating as a complementary mechanism to the central role of NATO 
in transatlantic defense cooperation.  In 1994, NATO endorsed the establishment of a 
Combined Joint Task Force to be made available to the alliance’s European members 
for operations outside the NATO area in which the U.S. chose not to participate.   
“Separable but not separate” forces would give NATO a flexibility it did not possess 
before and would also head off any effort by the French to turn the Western European 
Union into a competitor to NATO in the European security environment.
88   
 
At this point, the question was how to bring together NATO and the European 
defense initiatives. In order “to sell” the idea of ESDI to Congress, the Clinton 
Administration avoided any suggestion that the Europeans could be able to act without 
U.S. help or leadership; from a more practical point of view, the U.S. could scarcely 
imagine security crises that would not involve NATO and the United States.  Thus, the 
U.S. position combined an attempt to accommodate the European endeavor, while 
keeping NATO intact – and the U.S. in a leadership position in the continent’s 
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security.
89 These efforts underscored the concern that exists among U.S. foreign policy-
makers about possible loss of cohesion within NATO and more difficult decision-
making as a result of the U.S. losing its pre-eminent position, which would eventually 
undermine the transatlantic relationship as a whole. 
 
The official position of the United States has long been one of support for 
European integration, but in reality American interests in this process have been 
somewhat ambiguous.  The Clinton Administration, although initially ambivalent 
toward the European integrationist project, eventually came to support its economic 
dimension, but remained cautious toward its foreign policy pillar.  To the extent that 
European unity promotes peace and security in Europe, creates larger and more open 
European markets, welcomes trade and American foreign direct investment, and is able 
to act as a unified and effective foreign policy actor, integration is overwhelmingly in 
the U.S. interest.
90 Moreover, being the only superpower left, the United States has 
found that it needs an ally in countering problems other than the traditional security-
related ones, including environmental issues and organized crime.
91  Recognizing the 
need for a strong ally, in the face of the European Union will be a considerable asset in 
a world of increasing interdependence, the Clinton Administration chose to support 
European integration, rather than to “divide and rule,” thus “putting Europe first,” a 
policy, which thus far has been replaced by more realist preoccupations of the Bush 
Administration.  The position of the Bush Administration remains somewhat unclear, 
with President Bush welcoming the initiative, the Defense Secretary declining to 
endorse the RRF, and his deputy suggesting that the more positive view of Secretary of 
State Powell is not the official position of the administration.  Thus, the development of 
ESDP beset with problems, and its final relationship with NATO is far from definite.
92 
 
In addition to the strengthening of Western European capabilities, the new 
security challenges for NATO are shifting from Europe’s center to its periphery and 
beyond.  The U.S. remains the dominant security actor in the region and the strategy to 
be considered involves interdependent European, Middle Eastern, and Euroasian 
security concerns.
93   Particularly, there is the likelihood that NATO will have a role in 
further developing the relations with Russia.
94  In the words of Javier Solana, “there can 
be no security in Europe without a stable Russia,” and the NATO-Russian Founding Act 
and the Permanent Joint Council have set the stage for cooperation with Russia on 
issues of proliferation, environmental damages, nuclear safety, and terrorism.
95  
According to James Baker, the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia Permanent 
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Joint Council were designated to ameliorate Russian concerns by creating halfway 
between full NATO membership and full exclusion from NATO.
 96 
 
On the other hand, the past and future events in Russia are part of the priorities 
of the EU as well as of the U.S. Russia has been the main source of debate on the 
enlargement of NATO and on European stability. To some extent, the coordination of 
the EU and U.S. policies towards Russia is extremely important in order to preserve the 
stability in the region. In this sense, the EU–U.S. relations towards Russia must be 
aware of the development of three elements of Russian domestic politics: a) the 
performance of weak democratic institutions; b) the behavior of “losers” in the 
transition process, and c) the effects of the ideologies in the building of institutional 
processes.
97 These elements have a direct impact on Russian foreign policy and, in 
consequence, on the relations between the EU and the United States. 
  
The Bush Administration has had a twofold strategy with regard to Russia. The 
first was playing with the unilateralist card. For instance, with regard to the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the United States announced its unilateral withdrawal from it in 
December 2001. This action did not help president Putin’s internal performance. 
Another unilateral action was the U.S. intention to store, not destroy, its 
decommissioned warheads. The third action is to enhance the role of Russia inside 
NATO, allowing Russia to act as an equal partner, but in a very limited number of 
areas.
98 
  
Although perhaps it was not originally planned, the second strategy of the Bush 
Administration has been to cautiously welcome Russia in NATO. This shift in the U.S. 
position is mostly explained by the cooperative Russian attitude to face the “war” on 
terrorism after September 11
th. Thus, on May 28, 2002, the Rome Declaration between 
Russia and NATO was signed, in which Russia was welcomed as a participant, not a 
full member, giving Moscow a consultative role in forging NATO strategies on nuclear 
non-proliferation, crisis management, missile defense and counter-terrorism. Moscow 
will not be bound by the NATO collective defense pact. Nor will Russia have a veto 
over NATO decisions or a vote in the expansion of its membership. The new council 
does not replace the North Atlantic Council, the body in which NATO usually makes its 
decisions. If no consensus is reached in the new 20-nation council, then NATO’s 19 
members reserve the right to withdraw the contentious topic from discussion. The new 
arrangement between Russia and the alliance replaces a 1997 accord, negotiated during 
the Clinton Administration, that allowed Russia to participate in discussions with 
NATO only after all of the alliance’s members had reached agreement on a common 
position. “Russia complained that the arrangement was a sham, because it made it 
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appear that Moscow went along with policies it did not agree with and in fact had no 
voice in shaping”.
99 
  
Despite its weaknesses, Russia keeps a prominent position in the international 
arena. Outstandingly after September 11
th, Russia has drawn the attention of the United 
States for several reasons, among others: First and most important is nuclear security, 
encapsulating the threat that terrorists might steal weapons-grade plutonium, or 
radiological material for a dirty bomb. “Second, Russia is the world’s third-largest oil 
producer and has the world’s largest gas reserves. It is the country best able to reduce 
America’s dependence on oil from the Gulf. Third, Russia is needed in the war against 
al-Qaeda”.
100  
 
The closer relationship between Russia and the West still has to overcome some 
obstacles, basically the role of Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave territory between Poland 
and Lithuania, and a solution in Chechnya. In addition, the enlargement of NATO 
seems feasible, although the coming NATO meeting in November 2002 has to find a 
formula to avoid the dispersal of NATO’s security objectives. Some critics consider that 
“new invitations to Slovenia, Slovakia, perhaps the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, and possibly Bulgaria and Romania, would inevitably dilute the alliance, 
turning it into more of a security talking shop”.
101  
 
Final Remarks 
 
From the perspective of the present essay, power has multiple expressions. Despite the 
fact that military aspects are highly relevant for security, economic and political areas 
also reflect the capabilities of one or various states to influence the decisions of other 
states or international processes. The dynamics of international relations shows that 
there is a continuous distribution of power capabilities, based on the interrelation 
between international actors (mostly states but institutions as well), and global 
processes.  
  
  If there is a hallmark in the history of Europe during the XX century, it is its 
capacity to create new alternatives to face deep crises provoked by wars. Despite the 
fact that the return of intolerance is “blowing the horn” in some European countries of 
European machinery, there is an overwhelming evidence of actions intended to 
overcome these problems . The alternative chosen since the 1950s has been integration 
and the outcome of this process has given Europe a privileged place in the international 
arena. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, power has multiple expressions and implies 
not only receiving the profits of the successful economic modernization or keeping 
political pressure on the American hegemon, but also the responsibility to act in case of 
the emergence of violence.  
  
  When the EU is placed at the core of the analysis, the main concern is to fill out the 
vacuum left by the inaction of the United States or to constrain the U.S. policies that 
affect the EU. The reasoning based on blaming the United States is useful for preachers 
at any speaker’s corner in any public square of any European country, but not for 
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politicians or decision-makers. The EU has proven to be successful when it is able to 
speak with one voice, developing and deepening the cooperation with the United States. 
Both the EU and the United States share common premises about how the world should 
be. However, they frequently differ on the means or strategies. At this point, the EU has 
been able to constrain U.S. unilateralism based on multilateral approaches, particularly 
in the economic aspect within the WTO, and, at the same time, those international 
commitments have constrained also the EU. 
  
  However, for good or bad, in terms of security the EU has had a timid response to 
U.S. unilateralism, which sometimes is due to the European incapacity to act, such as 
during the Balkan wars. The EU is still reactive and is in its childhood, although there 
have been important improvements during the last few years within the CFSP. So far, 
the United States has welcomed (sometimes dubiously) European initiatives and it is 
Europe’s turn to show it is entering into the adolescence of its rising power. 
 
 
*          *         * 
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